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Abstract 19 
Objective: Governments are increasing their focus on mandatory public health 20 
programmes following positive economic evaluations of their impact. This review 21 
aims to examine whether loss of consumer choice should be included in economic 22 
evaluations of mandatory health programmes (MHP). 23 
Method: A systematic literature review was conducted to identify economic 24 
evaluations of MHP, whether they discuss the impact on consumer choice and any 25 
methodological limitations. 26 
Results: Overall 39 economic evaluations were identified, of which ten discussed the 27 
loss of consumer choice and six attempted to place a value on the loss of consumer 28 
choice. Methodological limitations included: measuring the marginal cost of 29 
compliance, unavailability of price elasticity estimates, the impact of income effects, 30 
double counting health impacts, biased willingness-to-pay responses, and “protest” 31 
responses. Overall it was found that the inclusion of the loss of consumer choice 32 
rarely impacted on the final outcome of the study. 33 
Conclusion: The impact of MHP on the loss of consumer choice has largely been 34 
ignored in economic evaluations. Its importance remains uncertain due to its 35 
infrequent inclusion and significant methodological limitations. Further research 36 
regarding which methodology is best for valuing loss of choice and whether it is 37 
importance to the final implementation decision is warranted. 38 
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42 
1. Introduction 43 
Governments are increasing their focus on preventative public health programmes to 44 
contain rising health costs caused by population ageing and the availability of more 45 
effective but costly technologies. Public health programmes can be introduced on 46 
either a voluntary or mandatory basis. Voluntary programmes give consumers the 47 
option (or ‘choice’) of adhering to a particular programme and impose no penalties for 48 
non adherence. Mandatory health programmes (MHP) require government legislation, 49 
but are appealing because there are significant savings in terms of enforcement and 50 
promotion costs in addition to being the most effective method of ensuring population 51 
compliance [1]. 52 
Recently some Governments have commissioned economic evaluations of MHPs to 53 
ascertain whether they result in a net gain to society [2-4]. The evaluation of MHPs, 54 
such as fortification and immunisation programmes, involves balancing two essential 55 
factors – benefits and risks – in the population. That is to say, the potential societal 56 
benefits (such as improved compliance) must be balanced against the risks, and 57 
potential harms, to individuals and communities [5]. While some people will benefit 58 
from MHPs, not all people will benefit and a small minority may experience harm, for 59 
example through adverse events. 60 
Regardless of whether the programme enforces or bans consumption of a good, MHPs 61 
restrict personal choice and deny consumers the ability to readily substitute particular 62 
goods or services. For example, some people may value the loss of the availability of 63 
a good (such as folate-free bread or iodine-free salt), incur the cost of buying a more 64 
expensive alternative (such as fluoride-free bottled water), prefer to not be vaccinated 65 
on the basis of religious, medical or social reasons [6], have a high risk aversion to 66 
adverse events (whereas the government is risk neutral), or simply prefer to exercise 67 
free choice in deciding what to consume. The ‘restriction’ on choice represents a loss 68 
in consumer welfare or more specifically consumer surplus – a measure of the net 69 
benefit of consumption (i.e. the difference between the consumer actually pays and 70 
the amount the consumer is willing to pay)1.  71 
The aim of this paper is to review the literature on the measurement and inclusion of 72 
the loss of consumer choice in economic evaluations of MHPs, and to discuss the 73 
potential policy implications of excluding consumer choice from economic 74 
evaluations. 75 
2. Methods 76 
A literature review was conducted to ascertain whether economic evaluations of 77 
MHPs include loss of consumer choice, and if so what methodology was used to 78 
quantify the loss of consumer surplus. The review focussed on finding examples of 79 
MHP economic evaluations that either mandatorily enforced, or banned, the 80 
consumption of a good. The search was conducted in Medline, EMBASE, EconLit 81 
and NHS EED databases. The review also included grey literature searches of 82 
published Government reports known to the authors. Search terms utilised were 83 
fortification or folate or folic or iodine or vaccination and (compulsory or mandatory) 84 
or fluoridation or trans-fat$ or (smoking near public) or cannabis or (food and 85 
(unhealthy or junk) and school$) or SunSmart or (bicycle and helmet) in combination 86 
with the search terms cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness or cost-utility or (economic 87 
and evaluation). The bibliographies of all retrieved publications were hand-searched 88 
for any relevant references missed in the database search. 89 
The search was limited to publications published in English. In EconLit the subject 90 
was limited to health. Papers were included if they compared health outcomes to the 91 
costs of the MHP. Papers were excluded if the mandatory programme preserved 92 
consumer choice. For example, mandatory nutritional labelling, smoking warnings on 93 
cigarette packets and banning of junk food advertising. 94 
                                                 
1 In addition to restricted choice, consumers may also face increased prices for these goods or services 
due to increased demand or higher manufacturing costs. However this amount is distinguished from the 
cost of reduced choice. 
The following information was extracted from each study: country, perspective of the 95 
analysis, methodology, primary measure of benefit, inclusion of adverse events and 96 
productivity impacts, and estimate of loss of consumer choice. 97 
3. Results 98 
The search for MHP economic evaluations identified 30 relevant articles [7-36]. Four 99 
additional government reports were identified [2-4, 37] and another nine articles were 100 
identified through pearling of references [38-46]. Overall 43 relevant articles were 101 
identified (see Table 1), representing 39 economic evaluations.  102 
The most common methodology used in the economic evaluations was cost-103 
effectiveness analysis (24 studies), followed by cost analysis (13 studies), cost-benefit 104 
analysis (7 studies), and cost-utility analysis (4 studies). Several studies used a range 105 
of methods to analyse the impact of the MHPs. The perspective of the evaluation was 106 
reported in only 10 studies, of which 9 claimed to use a societal perspective. Often the 107 
perspective was not discernable on the basis of the cost categories included in the 108 
evaluations. Health care costs were not included in ten studies. Given that they are 109 
economic evaluations of MHPs the exclusion of health care costs may have a 110 
significant impact on the final conclusion of these studies2. Adverse events associated 111 
with the MHP were included in six studies. For some MHPs, such as banning 112 
smoking in public places and mandatory bicycle helmet use, it is appropriate to not 113 
include adverse events. However for other MHPs, such as folate fortification, the 114 
omission of both treatment costs and pain and suffering caused by adverse events may 115 
have a significant impact on the final conclusion of the study. Productivity impacts 116 
incurred by individuals3 were explored in 12 studies and one included the productivity 117 
losses due to compliance with the legislation [37]. Exclusion of productivity impacts 118 
would be appropriate if the study took a health system or payer approach. However in 119 
three cases the authors stated that the study took a societal perspective but excluded 120 
productivity impacts. Again this may have a significant impact on the final conclusion 121 
of these studies. 122 
                                                 
2 This is not an issue for the WTP studies where health care costs are included implicitly. 
3 Productivity impacts incurred by health workers were considered a health care cost. 
Insert Table 1 here 123 
Of the 39 MPH economic evaluations identified, five studies(7 articles)4 attempted to 124 
value loss of consumer choice [2, 16, 31-33, 37, 47] while a further four studies 125 
mentioned that the introduction of a MHP would result in a loss of consumer choice 126 
[3, 4, 11, 34]. One additional study did not mention consumer choice directly, but 127 
estimated the loss in terms of people who quit cycling as a consequence of the 128 
introduction of mandatory helmet wearing legislation [28] (see Table 2). These 129 
articles are discussed below. 130 
Insert Table 2 here. 131 
Several methods have been suggested for valuing loss of consumer choice, these 132 
include: the cost of compliance, price elasticities, lost productivity and contingent 133 
valuation. The relative merits of each are discussed below.  134 
The cost of compliance 135 
Two studies that evaluated the cost-effectiveness of mandatory bicycle helmet 136 
legislation assumed that the maximum value of loss of consumer choice, to people 137 
who subsequently quit cycling, was the cost of complying with the regulation (i.e. the 138 
cost of a helmet) [16, 28]. The use of the Marshallian demand curve is appropriate in 139 
the case of bicycle helmet legislation as the income effect of a once-off purchase of a 140 
helmet is likely to be small. This is because the Hicksian compensated demand curve 141 
approaches the Marshallian demand curve as the income effect approaches zero [48]. 142 
However the methodology utilised overestimates the loss of consumer surplus – if it is 143 
assumed that the value each person places is uniformly distributed between zero and 144 
the cost of the helmet, thus the demand curve is linear and the loss of consumer 145 
surplus is a triangle, a closer approximation to the loss of consumer choice would be 146 
halve this number. However if the demand curve is convex to the origin, the loss of 147 
consumer surplus would remain overestimated. 148 
                                                 
4 One study assumed a value of the loss of consumer choice due to folate fortification of bread products 
to be $1 per person per year for each person not in the target population (women aged between 18 and 
45 years) [2, 20]. This assumption was not based on any evidence and consequently will not be 
discussed further in the report. 
A similar methodology was applied in an economic evaluation of restrictions on 149 
smoking in workplaces [37]. It was assumed the maximum value of loss of consumer 150 
choice to people who subsequently quit smoking was half their total expenditure on 151 
cigarettes forgone (assumed to be 20 cigarettes a day). In the cycle helmet example, 152 
this is akin to measuring the loss of consumer choice to cyclists on the basis of the 153 
cost of the bike rather than the helmet. Thus in the case of smoking, a more 154 
appropriate proxy would be the inconvenience of finding a designated smoking area 155 
or the value of cigarettes not consumed during working hours. The authors note that 156 
those who choose to stop altogether may welcome the ban as a cessation aid. 157 
Consequently their loss of consumer choice is likely to be much lower. Importantly, 158 
the methodology of estimating the cost of compliance does not consider the loss in 159 
consumer choice incurred by individuals who face no other alternatives (such as 160 
compulsory vaccination). 161 
Price Elasticities 162 
An alternative approach used to estimate the loss of consumer choice in continuing 163 
smokers was to multiply the reduction in cigarettes consumed at work by the price 164 
increase that would lead to the same change in behaviour, using price elasticities 165 
reported in the literature, multiplied by half [37]. This methodology estimates the loss 166 
of consumer choice using the Marshallian demand curve and assumes that the income 167 
effect of banning smoking in workplaces is small. This is a strong assumption since 168 
expenditure on cigarettes can be over a fifth of total income in the lowest 169 
socioeconomic group [49]. Furthermore price elasticity estimates based on small 170 
changes in taxation may not be appropriate for extreme policy changes (such as 171 
banning or forced consumption). Price elasticity estimates are often based on surveys 172 
or natural experiments involving people who voluntarily consume a good, not those 173 
for whom consuming a good gives them a negative utility. Consequently this 174 
methodology may underestimate the loss of consumer choice from forcing 175 
consumption. Finally, this methodology relies on the availability of price elasticity 176 
estimates, which may be problematic in circumstances when the good is not normally 177 
traded in the market place (such as fluoridated water). 178 
Lost Productivity 179 
Another alternative was to estimate drivers of the loss of consumer choice separately. 180 
For example, one study estimated the additional inconvenience incurred by smokers 181 
in terms of the lost productivity associated with time required to find a designated 182 
smoking area during work hours [37]. However, this cost may be incurred (partially or 183 
fully) by the employer rather than the employee and thus is not an accurate estimate of 184 
inconvenience. Furthermore this methodology does not value other factors driving 185 
loss of consumer surplus, such as the inconvenience to the smoker of standing outside 186 
in the cold wet weather. 187 
Contingent valuation 188 
Stated preference methods have been used to value loss of consumer choice. For 189 
example, a study may ask individuals hypothetical questions regarding their 190 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the introduction of a MHP or willingness to accept 191 
(WTA) compensation for not introducing a MHP5 to estimate their compensating or 192 
equivalent variation, respectively [50, 51]. 193 
Contingent valuation was used by one study which examined the impact of 194 
introducing fluoridated tap water into a community in the United Kingdom [31, 33]. 195 
After determining whether respondents were for or against the programme, 196 
respondents were asked either a) how much compensation would be required if they 197 
were willing to accept an annual tax rebate as compensation for fluoridation being 198 
implemented or b) how much they would be willing to contribute in extra annual 199 
taxation to have a device fitted to their water supply which would remove the fluoride 200 
from their drinking water. Two respondents gave a zero WTP stating that they could 201 
not afford to pay. The main reasons that people were willing to pay (or accept 202 
compensation) were violation of freedom of choice and the desire to have pure water. 203 
The study also identified a group of respondents, referred to as “protesters”, who 204 
refused to provide information regarding their WTP for water fluoridation, citing that 205 
they were “paying enough taxes/water rates already” or “the water companies should 206 
                                                 
5 Where people incur a loss from the introduction of a programme the questions should be phrased in 
terms of willingness to pay to avoid the introduction of a programme (equivalent variation), or 
willingness to accept compensation for introducing a programme (compensating variation). 
pay” (against taxation in general), or no amount of money would be sufficient to 207 
compensate for fluoride being added to the drinking water.  208 
Another study used contingent valuation to examine the impact of introducing folate 209 
fortification of flour. However, the study only explored the WTP for the introduction 210 
of the programme and not the WTP to avoid the introduction of the programme [32]. 211 
The study identified a group of respondents, referred to as “protesters” or “zeros”, 212 
who refused to provide information regarding their WTP for folate fortification. 213 
Reasons cited by these respondents included “manufacturers should pay or simply 214 
increase the price of food” (against taxation in general), or “there are other issues that 215 
I feel more strongly about” (awareness of opportunity cost), the respondent was too 216 
poor to pay any money (income bias), “it would only benefit pregnant women and not 217 
all society” or “because I don’t need it personally” (irrelevance or non-altruistic 218 
reasons), “people should know about folic acid already” and “people already have 219 
good access to information, it is generally available” (individual responsibility), “it is 220 
not necessary at the current time” or “I would want to know the outcome of further 221 
research” (lack of information), and “I am against universal additives in principle” 222 
(distrust of additives). It should be noted that some individuals, although against 223 
folate fortification, were willing to pay for fortification on the basis of altruism [32]. 224 
In some cases the existence of “protesters” would result in an underestimation of the 225 
WTP to avoid (or WTA compensation to allow) the MHP and thus lead to an 226 
underestimation of the loss of consumer choice. However the extent of 227 
underestimation depends on the specific MHP being evaluated and the reasons 228 
provided by respondents for not providing an estimate of their WTP or WTA. For 229 
example, if the key reason is ‘irrelevance’ the impact may be less than if the key 230 
reason is ‘no amount of money would be sufficient to compensate the individual’. 231 
Contingent valuation studies enable the valuation of aspects of a MHP not captured by 232 
other measures, such as quality adjusted life years (QALYs), and enable the 233 
estimation of value placed by all people from forcing consumption, unlike the price 234 
elasticity approach which is based on voluntary consumers only. On the other hand 235 
contingent valuation studies suffers from problems surrounding the hypothetical 236 
nature of the survey questions, the impact of different payment vehicles resulting in 237 
different valuations, and the association of WTP with ability to pay [50-52]. Protest 238 
responses are a key limitation in the use of contingent valuation studies; in particular 239 
the ability to identify a realistic payment vehicle in countries where the public rarely 240 
face costs is difficult. Consequently respondents may ignore costs as they assume they 241 
are not borne by them directly [51, 52]. This is less of an issue in countries where 242 
health care co-payments are widespread, or equivalently surcharges and grants are 243 
common within the tax system. Another key issue with contingent valuation studies is 244 
responder bias. For example, if the responder believes the survey is gathering 245 
information to inform priority setting, but they will not incur any costs, they may 246 
over-estimate their WTP for programmes they value (and vice versa for programmes 247 
they place a negative value on). On the other hand if the respondent believes the 248 
survey is to inform fee setting then they may under-estimate their WTP. 249 
Importantly, WTP methodology values MHPs as a whole [53], including the health 250 
benefits and harms. If the benefits and harms are excluded the responder may infer the 251 
level of benefits and harms incorrectly. Consequently, in the case of MHPs, WTP 252 
methodology suffers from the potential to double-count the value placed on negative 253 
aspects of the programme, such as the risk of adverse events, which are explicitly 254 
taken into account in economic evaluations. The methodology also provides no 255 
indication of the key drivers of disvalue of the MHPs which may be mitigated by the 256 
design of the programme. One alternative would be to consider these values as a 257 
stand-alone study during the decision making process. 258 
In summary, the inclusion of loss of consumer choice only influenced the final 259 
outcome of one study. However loss of consumer choice was rarely and often 260 
inappropriately measured, consequently the relevance of this parameter during 261 
economic evaluation is uncertain. 262 
Insert table 2 here 263 
4. Discussion 264 
The impact of MHPs on the loss of consumer choice has largely been ignored during 265 
economic evaluations. In some cases the lack of an estimate of the loss of consumer 266 
choice may not be an oversight, but rather a reflection of the perspective taken by the 267 
evaluators. For example, if a public health system perspective is adopted [54] then it 268 
would not be appropriate to include an estimate of the loss of consumer choice. 269 
However, for many health programmes choosing a health system perspective is too 270 
restrictive to capture all benefits and costs and consequently may lead to inefficient 271 
allocation of resources. Therefore a broader societal perspective may be preferred, in 272 
which case including loss of consumer choice would be justified. This is important 273 
because a recent review of health care economic evaluations guidelines found that, of 274 
a total of 26 guidelines reviewed, a societal perspective is preferred in six countries 275 
(Cuba, Finland, France, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden) and another five6 276 
countries preferred both a health system and societal perspectives (Austria, Ireland, 277 
Italy, Russia, and Spain) [55, 56]. 278 
Many MHPs may involve the use of resources that are not typically provided by a 279 
public health system (such as water treatment facilities or enforcement costs). 280 
Furthermore many MHPs are often evaluated by public health or non-health 281 
Government departments. Consequently, a whole-of-government or a societal 282 
perspective is the most appropriate. Guidelines for conducting economic evaluations 283 
by non-health Government departments suggest taking a societal perspective. For 284 
example, the UK Treasury suggests that [57]: 285 
“In principle, appraisals should take account of all benefits to the UK. 286 
This means that as well as taking into account the direct effects of 287 
interventions, the wider effects on other areas of the economy should also 288 
be considered. These effects should be analysed carefully as there may be 289 
associated indirect costs, such as environmental costs, which would also 290 
need to be included in an appraisal. In all cases, these wider effects 291 
should be clearly described and considered.” 292 
Similarly the Office of Best Practice Regulation in Australia suggests that[58] 293 
“…the costs and benefits to all people residing in Australia should be 294 
counted, as far as practical.” 295 
When a societal perspective is appropriate, the loss of consumer choice should be 296 
included in the analysis. Although it is worth noting that the inclusion of the loss of 297 
                                                 
6 Note that the latest Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee guidelines for Australia suggest that 
PBAC prefers a health system perspective over a societal perspective. 
consumer choice in all economic evaluations may raise equity issues. For example, 298 
there may be an increased probability that MHPs that largely affect low 299 
socioeconomic groups (e.g. smoking in public places) would be more likely to be 300 
cost-effective compared to those that largely affect high socioeconomic groups (i.e. 301 
cycling), all else being equal. This is because the ‘ability-to-pay’ effect would 302 
decrease the relative loss of consumer choice in the former group. This equity 303 
implication may or may not be acceptable to policy makers. 304 
When loss of consumer choice has been included in the economic evaluation of MHPs 305 
there have been significant limitations in the methodologies used. These include: the 306 
methodology used to estimate of the marginal cost of compliance; the unavailability 307 
of measures of price elasticity; the impact of income effects of the programme and 308 
consequently whether the Marshallian demand curve would be an acceptable proxy 309 
for the Hicksian demand curve; double counting of the health impacts; and biased 310 
responses and “protest” responses in contingent valuation studies. In particular, 311 
double-counting of negative health impacts, such as adverse events, is a key issue 312 
since this would bias the economic evaluation against the MHP, and vice versa. To 313 
avoid this issue, decision makers could use estimates of the loss of consumer choice 314 
as an additional, but distinct, piece of evidence along with the economic evaluation. 315 
However if this approach was chosen the decision maker would need to decide how 316 
much weight should be applied to each piece of evidence. 317 
None of the papers used discrete choice experiments (DCE) to estimate loss of 318 
consumer choice due to MHPs. According to Lancaster’s economic theory of value, 319 
individuals derive utility from the underlying attributes of a good and that preferences 320 
(and thus utility) across goods are revealed through their consumption choices [59]. 321 
On the basis of this theory, in a DCE respondents choose their preferred alternative 322 
from a choice set. Each alternative is described by a bundle of attributes, including 323 
cost, with each attribute described using a different level (i.e. $0, $20, $100 etc). The 324 
respondents repeatedly choose their preferred alternative from a series of hypothetical 325 
choice sets where the levels of each attribute differs [53]. 326 
The strength of the DCE approach is that choosing between bundles of goods is an 327 
easily comprehended task for respondents and there is evidence that it is both 328 
consistent with welfare theory [60, 61] and consistent with that observed in practice 329 
[62]. DCEs also enable the measurement in monetary terms of the marginal value 330 
placed on each attribute by including cost as one of the attributes. Thus DCEs are 331 
capable of directly measuring the compensation [61] required for introducing a MHP, 332 
while holding the health impacts constant. Unlike contingent valuation studies, this 333 
avoids the risk of double-counting the impact of the MHP on health and adverse 334 
events which have been considered explicitly in the economic evaluation. The 335 
problem of protest responders may be minimised if these responders simply ignore the 336 
cost variable, thus increasing the uncertainty but not necessarily biasing the results. 337 
Furthermore the estimated compensation can be directly incorporated into an 338 
economic evaluation, avoiding the need for decision makers to decide how much 339 
weight should be placed on each piece of evidence as with contingent valuation 340 
studies.  341 
DCEs have the advantage of being able to disentangle the drivers of loss of choice in 342 
MHPs, since it is unlikely that loss of consumer choice will equate to a single 343 
universal value. The valuation is likely to vary by programme depending on the 344 
following: whether consumption of the good is being made compulsory or banned; the 345 
strength of opposition to mandatory programme; the proportion of people who 346 
voluntarily consume the health good without government intervention; and how 347 
strongly people care about deviations away from their voluntary level of consumption; 348 
the level of individual benefit and strength of altruism towards others. The latter point 349 
is interesting because this is likely to depend on who the others are and what they are 350 
gaining or losing. For example, evidence suggests that people value gains in health 351 
more highly for people with a low quality of life or short life expectancy before 352 
treatment, if there is no other treatment available, and if the individual is young [63]. 353 
Unfortunately some issues faced with contingent valuation, such as the association of 354 
WTP with ability to pay, would still be encountered in DCEs [64].  355 
Due to the limitations identified in the literature it is uncertain whether the inclusion 356 
of the loss of consumer choice in the economic evaluations would change the 357 
conclusion of these studies. Further research regarding the most appropriate method to 358 
measure the loss of consumer surplus, including the viability of using DCEs which is 359 
yet to be explored, and whether its inclusion would make a difference to the final 360 
implementation decision is warranted. 361 
This paper raises the issue that loss of consumer choice, which has been identified by 362 
the general public as a key argument against the introduction of MHP, has largely 363 
been ignored by the literature. When it has been considered there are significant 364 
limitations with the approaches taken to date. Even so, incorporation of the loss of 365 
consumer choice into future economic evaluations of MHPs does not address key 366 
ethical issues with MHPs. For example, if education campaigns regarding the risk of 367 
certain behaviours on health fail are Governments justified in intervening with 368 
mandatory legislation or should the responsibility continue to lie with the individual? 369 
[65] It is generally accepted that the Government intervenes if individuals are directly 370 
harmed by other people’s actions, such as with violence. However how far does this 371 
responsibility extend? For example, the failure to immunise children puts other 372 
children at risk consequently does this justify compulsory vaccination, despite 373 
significant risks of adverse events to some children? Is it more acceptable to ban 374 
smoking in workplaces due to second-hand smoke or due to concern for the health of 375 
the smoker? [66] Is Government intervention more justifiable if individuals are less 376 
able to make rational decisions for themselves, thus justifying banning junk food in 377 
schools or SunSmart for kids? Finally, are Government’s more justified in using 378 
MHPs if they incur a majority, of not all, of the health costs? These questions cannot 379 
be answered directly by economic evaluations. 380 
5. Conclusions 381 
The impact of MHP on the loss of consumer choice has largely been ignored in 382 
economic evaluations. The importance of loss of consumer choice remains uncertain 383 
due to its infrequent inclusion. There are also significant methodological limitations 384 
for estimating the appropriate value. DCEs may provide an improved methodology to 385 
estimate the loss of consumer choice and avoid double counting in economic 386 
evaluations. Further research regarding the suitable methodologies, including DCEs, 387 
and the importance of the loss of consumer choice to the final implementation 388 
decision is warranted. 389 
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Table 1:  Literature review of mandatory health programmes 576 
 Search Results Relevant Articles 










      
Compulsory 
vaccination 
18 33 3 2 2  
Folate or iodine 
fortification 
200 813 50 48 14 3 
Fluoridation of 
tap water 
86 23 1 7 19 2 
Sunsmart (no 
hat, no play)* 
23 2 0 1 0  
Bicycle 
helmets use 
12 8 3 4 5 2 
Banning 
Consumption 
      
Trans fats 3 4 7 0 0  
Smoking in 
public places 
19 21 57 47 3 1 
Cannabis use 9 115 153 3 0  
Unhealthy food 
in schools 
2 2 5 0 0  




* Search terms utilised were fortification or folate or folic or iodine or vaccination and (compulsory or mandatory) or 
fluoridation or trans-fat$ or (smoking near public) or cannabis or (food and (unhealthy or junk) and school$) or SunSmart or 
(bicycle and helmet) in combination with the search terms cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness or cost-utility or (economic and 
evaluation). 
** Search terms utilised were fortification or folate or folic or iodine or vaccination and (compulsory or mandatory) or 
fluoridation or trans-fat$ or (smoking near public) or cannabis or (food and (unhealthy or junk) and school$) or SunSmart or 
(bicycle and helmet). 
 577 
Table 2:  Details of economic evaluations of mandatory health programmes 578 
Study Health programme Country 
Methodology, 




















CBA: increased life 
expectancy (valued 
using the value of a 
statistical life lost 
used by the UK 
Department of 
Transport) 
Not stated Yes N/A 
Productivity gains due 
to smokers quitting 
and increased life 




Losses to continuing smokers and quitters was estimated by 
comparing the impact of bans on reduced smoking compared to 
price increases that would lead to the same change in behaviour. 
Additional lost productivity time due to leaving work to smoke 
was also estimated. In comparison the Overall the decision to 
implement the programme would be unchanged regardless of 
including the impact on consumer choice: 
 
£2,700m to £3,100m total benefits- £155m for continuing 
smokers - £550m for quitters - £430m for productivity impact =  
£1565m to £1965m 














WTP and WTA compensation (n=100 surveyed, of which 53 
answered the WTP/WTA question). Of the 13 that were against 
the programme, 8 were asked how much they were WTP to 
avoid, and 5 were asked how much they were WTA 
compensation. Overall the decision to implement the programme 
would changed by including the impact on those against the 
programme: 
 
40 in favour/53* WTP=£12.63 – 8 against/53 * WTP=£29.38 – 5 











WTP (n=76 surveyed, of which 40 answered the WTP question). 
Of the 15 that were against the programme, all were asked how 
much they were WTP to avoid, of which 7 refused to answer. 
Overall the decision to implement the programme would be 
unchanged regardless of including the impact on those against 
the programme: 
 




use to prevent 





CEA: LYG or 
hospitalisations 
avoided 
Not stated No N/A No 
Maximum value of cycling to irregular cyclists who 
subsequently quit cycling is assumed to be the cost of complying 
with the regulation i.e. the cost of a helmet. Overall the decision 
to implement the programme would be unchanged regardless of 
including the impact on those who quit cycling. 
 
Cost/LYG without lost to quitters = $83,857 to $107,924 for 5 to 
12 year olds, $672,256 to $792,234 for 13 to 18 year olds, and 
$862,138 to $983,034 for 19+ year olds. 
 
Study Health programme Country 
Methodology, 











Included Estimate loss of consumer choice 
Cost/LYG with lost to quitters = $88379 to $113,744 for 5 to 12 
year olds, $694,013 to $817,874 for 13 to 18 year olds, and 






to reduce NTDs 
Australia CEA: NTDs and DALYs avoided Not stated Yes No No 
Assumed $1 per person per year for each person not in the target 







CBA and CEA: WTP 
and head injuries 
averted 
Societal Yes N/A 
Value of avoiding an 
injury requiring short 
stay hospital treatment 
or long stay hospital 
treatment was based 
on a WTP survey 
which included 
productivity costs, 
property damage, legal 
and court costs, and 
some medical costs. 
Loss associated with people who quit cycling were assumed to 
incur 1) no cost, 2) cost equal to the cost of the helmet, and c) an 
additional $30 societal cost on top of the cost of the helmet to 
account for reduced exercise and increased motorcar use. Overall 
the decision to implement the programme would be unchanged 
regardless of including the impact on those who quit cycling. 
 
Benefit:cost ratios (assuming all scenarios involves quitters and 
the same value of benefits): 
1) 13.5 for children aged 5-12 years, 5.9 for children aged 13-18 
years, 2.6 for adults. 
2) 12.6 for children aged 5-12 years, 5.5 for children aged 13-18 
years, 2.5 for adults. 
3) 6.6 for children aged 5-12 years, 2.9 for children aged 13-18 
years, 1.8 for adults. 
WTP=Willingness-to-pay, WTA = Willingness-to-accept, CBA = cost-benefit analysis, CEA = cost-effectiveness analysis, CUA = cost utility analysis, DMFT = decay, loss, and filled teeth, NTD = neural tube defects, 579 
QALYs = Quality adjusted life years, DALYs = Disability Adjusted Life Years, LYG = life years gained. 580 
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